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SOURCE            Nan-fang Jih-pao.

Sian, 4 January 1950 (Hsin-hua)--In a report rendered to a meeting of the cadres of the party in Sian on 4 November 1949, Ma Wen-jui (馬文瑞), chairman of the organization department of the Northwest Bureau of the party, reported on the habits of cadres and the problem of uniting the old and new cadres in service. When many of the cadres moved into Sian, they had never had any city experience at all. Their strenuous efforts to carry out the party's policies in spite of this inexperience merit our praise, and Chairman Mao has indicated his approbation by saying that he hopes the cadres will continue to carry on in the same fine manner. However, some of the old cadres, or those not entirely new, have manifested certain habits and thinking that need mentioning and correction.

1. They do not put their hearts into their work. A number of comrades have failed to live up to our standard in long-term duties. Some cadres have a desire to return to their native villages, thinking that there they may be able to advance faster. Others, now that the war is over, want to shift to other occupations. Still others, who are advanced in years, are worried about their families at home. Then there are those of rural origin who feel that their capabilities are limited and fear assuming responsibilities on higher government levels. Others are unhappy because they see the later cadres with more education being advanced rapidly without going through the struggles they had to endure.

Whatever the difficulties, there are two basic reasons for most of them. One is the lack of suitable leadership able to explain conditions satisfactorily and to arrange work commensurate with the capabilities and dispositions of the cadres. The other is that some cadres follow their own erroneous thinking. They are not sufficiently acquainted with the principles of the revolution and spend their time thinking of themselves and their treatment until they cannot concentrate on their work. If they do not overcome this habit, they will not be able to do good work, no matter where they may be assigned, since a man's personal advantage is not of the first importance to the party and its work.

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2. Dilatoriness is the trouble with many cadres. They never get anything done on schedule, although they are eternally busy. Again, leadership is at fault in not having set up a scientific system for the cadres to follow, leaving them to follow the old patterns. Some lack a sense of responsibility which no amount of system or method can instill.

3. Some cadres are looking for ease and plenty now that the battles are over, and others are corrupt. Some want a change of work where things will be easier, or the remuneration greater. The basic factor in this is that they are still capitalistic at heart; they have not absorbed the proletarian viewpoint. They fail to recognize that present attainments are only a small step in the long journey of the revolutionary movement. Such persons, if they do not change, will not be safe workers no matter where they are.

4. Some cadres have no political consciousness. They do not know how to handle telegraphic messages or military equipment. They are not careful about who hears them talking. These people are a great danger to the party.

Without a change in these old cadres we cannot elevate the standards of our work. Hence we urge our leaders to tighten up on thought leadership and thought education. The following steps should be taken:

1. Official leadership and party branches should collaborate to coalesce their work for this year and practice democracy and criticism and self-criticism. There should be a careful consideration of the thinking of the cadres and leadership methods. Each cadre should be led to express himself concerning his own understanding and opinions. He should be taught to analyze and summarize them. Standards for improvement should be set in order to elevate both leaders and those led.

Leaders should consider three things: (a) The work of every period should be planned and assessed. While every portion of the revolutionary program is important, nevertheless, if no distinction is made in giving the correct weight to the various parts of the program, a man will become merely one who is continually busy and will lose his power of leadership. He will do nothing well. (b) A system of investigation and summarization of work, in order to effect steady improvement and to encourage the cadres to higher attainments should be set up. (c) A studious manner of life should be adopted. The cadres' thinking and theoretical knowledge should be broadened. Leading the cadres in study should become the most important duty of leaders in official positions. If this is not done, it will be difficult later to eradicate the weaknesses of the cadres in the higher echelons, or to improve their work.

2. In the handling of cadres, leaders must be sure of having a sufficient number of experienced cadres in each group to advance the work. Changes may also be made in the interests of the work. Cadres unsuited for official work may be transferred to work on a lower level or sent to a party school for improvement. Furthermore, careful attention should be given to reading, taking part in discussions, home conditions, working conditions, etc., of the cadres, and a proper solution found for their problems so that they can participate wholeheartedly in their work.

3. A strict system of rewards and punishments should be maintained. Those who do well should be given spiritual and material rewards. Those who fall into covetous or corrupt practices should be properly punished. Discipline must be maintained for the good of the work. However, the best treatment for these faults is education. Discipline is for the purpose of education. It should be maintained with discretion, and consideration should be given to the attitude of the one at fault, whether he is willfully at fault or only mistakenly so. Those who persist in a wrong course and refuse to change will have to be dealt with by law. Only thus can they be taught;

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at the same time, others will learn. All cadres should have periodic examinations and grading. All offices should have annual ratings in order to understand the condition of each cadre and to educate the cadres in meeting standards.

At present, there are three types of cadres in the border regions: old cadres, new cadres drawn from among the intellectuals, and official and technical personnel taken over from the KMT regime. The latter two types now make up about 70 percent of the present force in a number of government units. In some units the percentage is as high as 90. Consequently, a very important problem for us now is to know how to train and integrate these new cadres into the effective service of the people.

Most of the young students now employed in the border regions are graduates of the Yen-an school of finance, or of the Ta Chung or Ke Ming Universities in Peiping. They are progressive, enthusiastic, and willing to learn from the older cadres, but they have not been refined in the crucible of the revolutionary struggle and they are mostly from modestly capitalistic homes. Their organizational experience is slight. They are inclined to follow their own interests and place their own ambitions above the interests of the revolution. They are often puerile in their thinking, afraid of meeting obstacles. In their first experience in the revolution they suppose that everything in the party is good. When they see defects, or are crossed, they become dissatisfied and discouraged. Some of the old intellectuals have not discarded their old attitude of intellectual pride and are unable to be humble in the face of hardship.

Among those taken over from the KMT are real intellectuals and men of exalted skills, and their work from many aspects is of a high order. They were formerly dissatisfied with the KMT, hence they joined the revolution; however, they are not inured to the revolutionary manner of life and their spirit of service to the people is insufficient. Many of them have joined the revolutionary movement for the sake of a livelihood: in their work they manifest the hireling spirit, and a desire to have their own way. They have carried over from their old life a desire for being served, a desire for fame and position, and other disagreeable traits; but they are willing to progress, so we have accepted them. A large number of them can be made over into useful revolutionaries.

During the 5 months that we have been in Sian, there have not appeared any great cleavages between the old and new cadres, owing to the understanding attitude of the old and the willing spirit of the new. However it cannot be said that there have been no problems. On the contrary, many of the old cadres are insufficiently acquainted with the program for unifying, educating, reforming, and using the new cadres. Hence many of them cannot exert the proper influence of leadership toward the new; in some cases their demands are too great and their assistance too slight, or they do not assign their tasks properly and thus hinder their progress. Other old cadres do not enter into the lives of the new, maintaining an attitude of aloofness until the new workers do not feel at home with them. Consequently, the old and new cadres constitute two camps and have little in common.

The problem of how to integrate, educate, and employ the new cadres thus becomes an important problem for us. We must seek to understand them, especially those taken over from the KMT. They have received no revolutionary training and their viewpoint differs from ours. They are unfamiliar with CCP policies, principles, and methods of work. Therefore, we must depend upon our old cadres to be a skeleton structure into which we can integrate these new workers. They must take the initiative to guide, reform, and help these new cadres. To this end the old cadres must elevate their own standards and change their thinking and habits. The new cadres can then profit by the experience in hardship and service of the old cadres and adopt their established political viewpoints and their habits of simplicity and frugality. The old

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cadres may acquire skills and culture from the new ones. While, in the beginning, these new workers must be strictly dealt with according to our principles, there must be no hint of a closed-door policy. Those whose political attitudes are correct and who have ability should be employed. In helping them to reform, attention should be paid to the practical features of their situation; they cannot be measured by the same standards as the old cadres. If, in certain situations, the relations of the old and new cadres are difficult, the old cadres should assume the larger responsibility. This is very important, as Chairman Mao has admonished us, because the old cadres have had more training and have a better understanding of things. Nevertheless, we cannot countenance political obduracy in the new workers; we must insist upon reform. Only thus can we place our program upon a higher plane.

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